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# **40CFR191, NAS, and HR1020 "Standards"**

## **A Preliminary Comparison of Potential Regulatory Standards for Yucca Mountain**

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# Outline

**Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)  
involvement with the "Standards"**

**EPRI's TSPA code, IMARC**

**Preliminary comparison of the "Standards"**

Basic "Standard" form (release rate; dose rate; health risk)

10,000 year versus peak dose or health risk sensitivities

"Critical groups"

"Moving the fence post"

**Preliminary conclusions**

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# **EPRI involvement**

**EPRI conducts research for US nuclear utilities**

**US utility view: The "Standard" must**

- protect the health of present and future generations
- be licensable (i.e., not ask for more than science can deliver)

**EPRI actively participated in the NAS TYMS  
Committee public meetings**

- analysis of 40CFR191
- analysis of alternate Standards
- recommended a Standard

**Assessment of NAS recommendations, HR1020  
underway**

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# **EPRI's primary assessment tool -- TSPA code, IMARC**

**Developed by Risk Engineering and a small team of  
experts**


**Event tree approach**

**Recent additions:**


Extend to 1,000,000 years

Time-varying infiltration rate (pluvials)

Hydrology model: 3-D in saturated zone, 1-D in unsaturated zone;  
fracture/matrix coupling; dispersion; daughter ingrowth



## EVENT TREE BRANCHES USED IN THE PRELIMINARY ANALYSES (IMARC PHASE 3)



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# **Preliminary comparison of the "Standards"**

**Basic "Standard" form (release rate vs. dose rate or  
health risk)**

**10,000 year versus peak dose or health risk**

**"Critical Groups"**

**"Moving the fence post"**

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
# Parameter sensitivity - release rate vs. dose/health risk criteria

## Saturated zone flow velocity


Higher velocity *increases* “release” past boundary

Higher velocity can cause more dilution - so *reduces* dose





# EXPECTED ANNUAL DOSE VS. TIME FOR INDIVIDUAL NUCLIDES



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# Time period of Standard can significantly impact the waste isolation strategy

**0-~10<sup>4</sup> years - transient period. Important factors:**

- Hydrothermal behavior
- Container corrosion resistance
- Number of leaking containers
- Matrix alteration/dissolution rate
- Fast flow paths
- Longitudinal dispersion
- Saturated zone dilution
- Biosphere components

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
**Time period of Standard can significantly impact the waste isolation strategy (continued)**

**~10<sup>5</sup> years and beyond - peak dose or health risk period. Important factors:**

Saturated zone dilution


Biosphere components

# TOTAL EXPECTED ANNUAL DOSE VS. TIME



Small Population

# TOTAL EXPECTED ANNUAL DOSE VS. TIME



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# Comparison of health risk limits

## NAS

*Suggested* annual individual risk limits of  $10^{-6}$  to  $10^{-5}$   
Risk to an average member of a "critical group"

## HR1020

100 mrem/yr equals an annual individual risk limit of  $5 \times 10^{-5}$   
Risk to an average individual in the local population

## 40CFR191 (based on 1,000 deaths in 10,000 years)

Annual, *population-averaged* individual risk limits of:  
< $10^{-10}$  for C-14 (world population of 10 billion assumed)  
< $10^{-5}$  if 10,000 people (drinking water only)  
< $10^{-3}$  If 100 people (agricultural - groundwater source)

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# Critical Groups - NAS approaches

## 1. Probabilistic critical group

- a group that is at greatest risk
- should be small in number (less than a few tens)
- homogeneous in risk (within a factor of 10 or less) w.r.t. "diet and other aspects of behavior"
- "Risks can be homogeneous even when outcomes are quite diverse"
- compare Standard to the mean of the critical group

## 2. Subsistence farmer critical group

- assumed to represent maximally exposed individual
- must assume individual is at the worst place all of the time
- can be adjusted for realistic well locations and water withdrawal rates



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# Critical Groups (continued)

## 40CFR191

Population-based approach neglects risk heterogeneity

Therefore, no special protection of those at greatest risk (beyond 1,000 years)

## HR1020

Average individual in the local population

- spatially averaged population distribution
- average of distributions in consumption rates

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# Explore the basis for a limit between $10^{-6}$ to $10^{-5}$ per year:

## Involuntary risks or risk limits (annual individual average):

<u>Source</u>	<u>Risk</u>
Being struck by a crashing airplane <sup>1</sup>	$4 \times 10^{-6}$
Extra fatal cancer risk living in Denver <sup>2</sup>	$1 \times 10^{-5}$
US FDA food additive regulatory risk "floor" <sup>3</sup>	$1 \times 10^{-6}$
US EPA general risk limit range <sup>4</sup>	$10^{-6}$ - $10^{-3}$

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<sup>1</sup>Harvard Center of Risk Analysis, 1992 Annual Report, pg. 3.

<sup>2</sup>(relative to living in New York) Wilson, R., 1980, Risk/Benefit Analysis for Toxic Chemicals, "Ecotoxicology and Environmental Safety", Vol. 4, pg. 370-383.

<sup>3</sup>Wilson and Crouch, Science, Vol. 236, pg. 293, 1987.

<sup>4</sup>Statement by William K. Reilly, US EPA Administrator on Environmental Tobacco Smoke, Jan. 7, 1992. "Merely for comparison, EPA generally sets its standards or regulations so that risks are below 1-in-1,000 to 1-in-1 million."

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# **Health risk limit - “critical group” link conclusions**

**Involuntary health risks of  $10^{-6}$  to  $10^{-5}$  are broadly tolerated by society**

**Group sizes are often orders of magnitude larger than a few tens of individuals**

**Risk heterogeneity within existing “critical groups” can be large**

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# Implications for “critical groups” at Yucca Mountain:

**Applying a  $10^{-6}$ /yr limit to a maximally exposed individual is inconsistent and *very* conservative**

**A  $\sim 10^{-5}$ /yr limit to an average individual in the local population (HR1020 approach) is still conservative**

- present and future local Yucca Mountain populations probably much smaller than Denver (or populations near airports)

**US FDA’s risk “floor” of  $10^{-6}$ /yr implies**

- averaging of food consumption habits over a large population is acceptable

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# Illustration of the “average individual” concept

**EPRI first proposed this approach to the NAS<sup>5</sup>**

**“Statistical” components (i.e., based on present day  
behavioral distributions)**

Water and food consumption

Agricultural/urban mix

Agricultural practices

**Probabilistic components**

Water source (local or distant)

Well depth (base on known hydrogeologic properties)

Well location (can assume random placement)


Contamination detection and remediation

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<sup>5</sup>EPRI TR-104012, "A Proposed Public Health and Safety Standard for Yucca Mountain", Electric Power Research Institute, Palo Alto CA, December 1994.

# SENSITIVITY TO POPULATION

FOR AN AVERAGE PERSON IN THE CRITICAL POPULATION



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
# **The “fence post”: Downstream position assumed for licensing calculations**

**NAS: Edge of the repository footprint**

**40CFR191: 5 km from edge of repository**

**HR1020: edge of the withdrawn land**

# TOTAL EXPECTED ANNUAL DOSE VS. TIME



Small Population



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# Conclusions

**Both NAS recommendations and HR1020 are a significant improvement over 40CFR191**

They both directly regulate health effects (i.e., they are dose- or health risk-based)

Their limits are based on broadly tolerable individual risk values

**Individual risk limits and “critical groups” should be consistent**

Annual individual risk range of  $10^{-6}$  to  $10^{-5}$  is broadly tolerable

Inconsistent approach if applied to a maximally exposed individual

Most consistent if applied to average individual in the local population

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# **Conclusions (continued)**

## **Time of regulatory cutoff affects the amount of work to be done**

Many parameters/processes are important if regulations set at  
~10,000 years only

Fewer affect peak doses or health risks

## **Location of “fence post” not very critical**